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ABSTRACT 
Despite increased attention to internal controls and risk assessment, traditional 
audit approaches do not seem to be highly effective in uncovering the majority of 
frauds. Less than 20 percent of all occupational frauds are uncovered by auditors. 
Forensic accounting has recognized the need for automated approaches to fraud 
analysis yet research has not examined the benefits of forensic continuous 
auditing as a method to detect and deter corporate fraud. The purpose of this 
paper is to show how such an approach is possible. A model is presented that 
supports the acceptance of forensic continuous auditing by auditors and 
management as an effective tool to support the audit function, meet 
management’s regulatory objectives, and to combat fraud. An approach to 
developing such a system is presented. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, businesses have faced increased regulatory oversight and 
reporting requirements combined with global competition and increased costs of 
raw materials and labor. As a result, management seeks an efficient but effective 
approach to governance which satisfies compliance requirements but also protects 
the organization from fraud at an affordable cost.  
With organizations routinely processing terabytes of information daily achieving 
important audit objectives has become a daunting task. Traditional audit 
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approaches and sampling methods cannot be expected to uncover the majority of 
transactional errors or occupational fraud (Wells, 2011; Oringel and Aldhizer, 
2009). Technology offers opportunities to detect and deter fraud more efficiently 
and effectively. Statement on Audit Standards No. 99 (SAS 99), Consideration of 
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, codifies many fraud detection procedures 
and encourages their use by auditors to detect client fraud risk and identify 
transactions to be tested (AICPA 2002, AU 316.52, AU 316.61; Lanza and 
Gilbert, 2007). Technological skills, however, often exceed the competency of 
auditors causing them to resort to less effective manual approaches. 
The regulation that has had the most profound impact on management and 
auditors in the past decade, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX02), requires 
that CEOs and CFOs assess and attest to the effectiveness of the organization’s 
internal control structure. It also imposes increased penalties for financial 
statement fraud. Both SOX02 and SAS 99 encourage management and external 
auditors to employ technological approaches and embedded audit modules to 
audit financial transactions and internal controls (Roth and Espersen, 2003). 
Forensic continuous auditing (FCA) will result in a stronger internal control 
environment by detecting a greater percent of transactional errors and anomalies 
that might indicate fraud or misuse. The low percentage of frauds currently 
uncovered by external and internal auditors affirms the ineffectiveness of 
traditional techniques. 
SOX02 Section 409 accelerates the SEC filings for Form 10-Q and annual report 
Form 10-K. The new rules will eventually require public companies to file annual 
reports within sixty days of their year-end and quarterly reports within thirty-five 
days of the end of the quarter. The FTC’s red flag rules, effective December 31, 
2010 for financial institutions and certain other firms under FTC jurisdiction 
including CPA firms, require companies to check for and report specific 
violations. These rules are expected to increase compliance costs. Automating the 
audit process will enhance the company’s ability to comply with these reporting 
requirements and lower overall governance costs. Although increased regulatory 
pressure mandates more attention to internal controls, these pressures could 
actually increase fraud opportunities by overwhelming management and auditors 
with reporting requirements. 
Despite increased attention to internal controls and risk assessment, traditional 
audit approaches lack effectiveness in uncovering occupational fraud. In its 2010 
Report to the Nations, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE ) 
noted that most of the frauds were uncovered by anonymous tips and less than 20 
percent are uncovered by either internal or external auditors. This is partly 
because external auditors focus on the organization’s financial statements only 
once a year and most auditing concentrates on small sample sets of selected 
transactions over fixed periods of time. A more effective approach would be to 
audit all or a large part of the transactions continuously. 
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Continuous auditing, which has been the focus of much research and has notable 
successful implementations (Alles and Vasarhelyi, 2008), still eludes many 
companies (Alles et al., 2008). The major barriers are technical – the lack of 
embedded audit modules (EAMs) and auditor’s lack of the requisite technical 
skills (Li et al., 2007). Once operable, however, continuous auditing systems 
require less technical expertise and offer auditors a wealth of information that can 
increase audit quality while reducing the overall workload.  
Forensic accountants have recognized the need for automated approaches to fraud 
analysis yet research has not examined the benefits of continuous auditing as a 
method to detect and deter corporate fraud. The purpose of this paper is to show 
how such an approach is possible. Contributions are twofold. First, cogent 
arguments are presented, in the form of five propositions that support the 
necessity for a system of forensic continuous auditing. Second, the paper presents 
an approach to forensic continuous auditing that is scalable and can be phased-in 
to accommodate the needs of management, auditing and information technology. 
2. DEVELOPING THE FORENSIC CONTINUOUS AUDIT MODEL 
2.1 Impact of Regulation 
Management concerns about fraud have been heightened in the post-SOX02 
environment due to increased penalties for financial statement fraud and 
governance requirements for a costly internal control framework. Requirements 
for auditors have increased dramatically and are costly. SOX02 Sec. 404 requires 
management to evaluate and attest to the internal control structure within ninety 
days of the audit report date. Increased compliance is costly and increases audit 
fees. For example, SOX02 Sec. 404, which requires management to evaluate and 
attest to the internal control structure within ninety days of the audit report date, 
os estimated to have cost Fortune 100 companies about $7.8 million in 2005 of 
which audit fees were $1.9 million (Nondorf et al. , 2011).  
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Auditing Statement 2, 
An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction 
with an Audit of Financial Statements, states that it is management’s 
responsibility to design and implement a program of controls to prevent, detect 
and deter fraud. 
According to the ACFE, estimated fraud losses in the United States for 2008 were 
$994 billion. The highly publicized frauds of the past decade have led to increased 
emphasis on internal controls. Adoption of the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations (COSO) framework and Statement on Auditing Standard No. 78, 
Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit, place greater 
demands on external auditors. The more detailed information technology (IT) 
controls, such as those found in the Control Objectives for Information 
Technology (COBIT) framework, have made IT audits standard for larger 
companies. Lack of technical expertise to conduct such audits has caused many 
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audit firms to seek out and depend upon more expensive third-party support.   
In SAS 99, the AICPA basically mirrored the tenets of SOX02 and increased the 
auditor’s due diligence responsibility for recognition of fraud. It also 
recommended extended use of technology for substantive testing and audit of 
controls. Auditors recognize that traditional audit practices that rely heavily on 
sampling small sets of transactions on a limited basis are not sufficient for 
evaluating internal controls or for detecting and deterring fraud. Also, financial 
audits that are based primarily on substantive testing and neglect detailed analysis 
of transactions or auditing through the computer cannot provide high levels of 
assurance.     
2.2 Auditing for Fraud 
Traditional audit techniques are not sufficient and do not provide continuous 
assurance. Nor are they likely to uncover the most risky frauds – those perpetrated 
by managers who can override controls and alter ledger and journal entries. In 
order to audit through the computer, a process is necessary that allows for testing 
of a significant number of transactions on a real-time basis and throughout the 
year rather than brief discrete intervals. The process should focus on areas of high 
risk, areas of concern by key stakeholders, and risks that are significant – those 
that may be unlikely but where an adverse incident could threaten the life of the 
enterprise. Through control frameworks such as COSO and COBIT, companies 
monitor and assess activities to detect incidents of errors, misuse and fraud and 
respond in a timely manner.  
To determine the likelihood that financial statements contain material 
misstatements, auditors conduct tests of transactions and substantive tests. Tests 
of transactions determine whether erroneous or falsified data have been 
processed. Substantive tests examine balances such as accounts receivable and 
accounts payable, inventories, liabilities and depreciation to provide assurance 
that financial statements are free from material misstatements (Rezaee et. al, 
2001). Normally, if tests of transactions do not reveal irregularities then less 
reliance is required on substantive testing. However, if tests of transactions reveal 
abnormalities then substantive testing must be expanded. In a continuous auditing 
environment, tests of transactions is an ongoing process and evidence is collected 
on a larger set of transactions and over a wider time-frame that with traditional 
methods. This lessens the need for substantive testing and reduces the role of the 
external auditors resulting in savings for the client firm. 
As a result of new regulatory requirements for compliance and emphasis on IT 
governance, auditors with forensic IT skills have been in increased demand 
(Hoffman, 2004). Because IT control deficiencies lead to accounting and financial 
reporting errors (Alaali, Grant, and Miller, 2008), it is important that auditors be 
able to identify IT problems that affect financial reporting, evaluate the extent and 
nature of the problems and be familiar with steps to correct these weaknesses 
(Grant et al., 2008). The Forensic Continuous Audit Model is shown in Figure 1. 
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The first requirement is continuous auditing.  
3. CONTINUOUS AUDITING 
3.1 Advantages of Continuous Auditing 
According to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
and Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) “A continuous audit is a 
methodology that enables independent auditors to provide written assurance on a 
subject matter, for which an entity’s management is responsible, using a series of 
auditors’ reports issued virtually simultaneously with, or a short period of time 
after, the occurrence of events underlying the subject matter.” (AICPA/CICA 
Research Study on Continuous Auditing, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Forensic Continuous Audit Model  
Because auditors often lack technological skills, a large percentage of companies 
rely primarily upon manual methods to evaluate internal controls. Consequently, 
these companies cannot determine how effective their control processes are on a 
daily basis despite large investments in governance (KPMG, 2010). In a 2009 
survey by the Institute of Internal Auditors, only 32 percent of 305 companies 
reported that they performed continuous auditing. By providing for automatic 
analysis of transactions, continuous auditing would relieve the auditors of the 
burdensome strain and allow greater focus on the analysis of suspicious 
transactions. 
3.2 Impact on Auditors and Governance 
Continuous auditing offers several advantages for auditors. Because it tests more 
transactions over a wider time-frame, it provides more comprehensive and timely 
assurance. Also, it is scalable allowing the magnitude and timing of tests to be 
performed based upon the assessed risk of the targeted transactions. It can reduce 
the amount of substantive testing performed during financial audits and allow 
greater focus on more important investigative matters. It can reduce audit risk and 
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increase management confidence in financial reports. It supports compliance 
reporting and reduces both errors and fraud. While continuous auditing assumes 
that all transactions are monitored in real-time, judicious application of the 
cost/benefit rule would schedule tests based upon the likelihood and severity of 
the risk. Performing the analytical procedures on a routine basis would lessen the 
work of the independent auditors and reduce their time on-site thus avoiding 
costly tests and unnecessary distractions during the workday.  
Tests of transactions using analytical procedures plus confirmation of account 
balances and events are the most common work product of financial audits. 
Confirmations may be either positive or negative. The negative confirmation is 
expected to be responded to only if the balance is not accurate. Research shows, 
however, that negative confirmations may not signify correctness as recipients 
may ignore them or they may be lost by mishandling (Aldhizer and Cashell, 2006; 
Caster and Sriram, 1996). When limited to small sample sets, tests of transactions 
may not be representative and cannot be expected to detect a large percent of 
errors or fraudulent activities. Given the increased transaction processing for most 
firms and increased regulatory pressures, the traditional approaches appear 
inadequate and require increased substantive testing. 
KPMG’s 2008 publication, Continuous Auditing/Continuous Monitoring: Using 
Technology to Drive Value by Managing Risk and Improving Performance, 
comments that: “As business risks of all kinds continue to proliferate, 
management and internal audit departments are actively seeking new ways to 
quickly gain access to valuable information to manage risk and improve 
performance. Such efforts increasingly include continuous auditing and 
continuous monitoring of organizational processes, systems, and controls.” 
3.3 Cost Savings 
Continuous auditing can result in substantial savings by reducing the amount of 
external auditor fees (Hermanson et al., 2006). Thus, it reduces overall 
governance costs while reducing the opportunity for errors or fraud. Measuring 
cost savings from CA is made difficult by the number of applications to which it 
is applied, the extent of testing and the frequency of testing. Thus, one company 
could be performing more extensive testing than others that claim to engage in 
CA. Siemens has claimed a substantial return from implementing CA in an ERP 
environment (Alles et al., 2006). They added both detective and preventive 
controls to an existing SAP system and use manual procedures to handle 
exception alerts. Detective controls allow auditors to uncover incidents of internal 
control violations. Preventive controls assist to insure internal controls are 
followed. 
Continuous auditing is also “more timely, comprehensive, accurate and less 
costly” (Alles et al., 2006, p. 212).  It can also free up time so internal auditors can 
pursue other value-added services (Oringel et al., 2009). These cost savings are 
likely to lure more companies into the CA waters. 
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3.4 Forensic Continuous Auditing 
FCA differs in the respect that more focus is placed upon the evaluation of 
sophisticated audit rules and examination of trends and anomalies that may reflect 
underlying errors or fraudulent commissions. FCA places more emphasis on the 
analysis of sensitive data sets and less emphasis on transactions for which 
detection risk is low. It also provides for a greater range of analysis and 
emphasizes improvement of the audit rules over time.  
Regulatory standards encourage the use of computer assisted audit tools and 
techniques (CAATs) for accessing and analyzing data files and suggest that risk 
assessment reflect the client IT standards (AICPA 2001, 2006). Recent research, 
however, indicates that only a minority of firms use CAATs for substantive 
testing because of the high level of complexity (Janvrin et al., 2009). Continuous 
auditing can provide much of the substantive testing in a routine manner and 
allow auditors to concentrate on the forensic analysis of data. 
3.5 Developing an Approach to Forensic Continuous Auditing 
There are various approaches to continuous auditing. The embedded audit module 
(EAM) approach depends upon audit specific software that resides in the targeted 
application (Alles, 2002). It allows auditors to determine which transactions are to 
be tested and at what frequency. Results are collected and reported real-time. 
Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems often contain EAM functionality 
(Groomer and Murthy, 1989).  Surveys show, however, that companies that use 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems often do not activate the EAM 
because of the significant resource requirements which can slow overall 
processing dramatically (Kuhn and Sutton, 2010; Debreceny et al., 2005).  
The technical nature of EAMs require that auditors acquire a higher levels of 
technical skills to implement these tools effectively and may hamper their 
adoption  (Debreceny et al., 2005). Some researchers state that auditors cannot 
effectively administer continuous auditing because of low technical proficiency 
and inability to communicate with IT personnel (Li et al., 2007). 
An alternative approach is the monitoring control layer (MCL) which uses an 
external software module linked to the target applications and databases 
(Vasarhelyi et al., 2004).  
Creating a virtual environment allows the EAM or MCL to be used outside the 
production version of the application and avoid system performance problems. 
System ghosting creates a copy of an entire system on separate hardware and 
eliminates any risk associated with processing live transactions.  Table 1 presents 
the steps for developing a FCA system.  
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Table 1: Developing a Forensic Continuous Audit System 
1. Examine internal controls for adequacy to mitigate risks. 
2. Determine which risks are most likely or could cause the most harm to the 
organization. These risks should be continuously audited. 
3. Examine each risk to determine the appropriate audit rules to be applied. 
4. Examine each risk to determine the appropriate number of transactions to 
be tested – this will vary depending upon perceived risk and management 
objectives.  
5. Examine each risk to determine the appropriate frequency of auditing – 
continuously, hourly, daily, weekly etc. 
6. Identify target applications and databases for the associated transactions 
and events. 
7. Establish a protocol for reviewing and handling the selected transactions. 
8. Build the link between the CAAT and the data file to automate the 
continuous audit cycle. Create a Virtual Environment on the audit server. 
9. Maintain an audit trail of the selected transactions and examine trends and 
anomalies. 
10. Refine the audit rules making modifications based on experience. 
11. Report results to management, the audit committee and external auditors.  
12. Set alarms for suspicious transactions or events that require immediate 
action. 
 
 
In the FCA Model, the second requirement is exception handling which applies 
the audit rules in order to uncover errors and suspicious transactions.  
4. EXCEPTION HANDLING 
4.1 Handling of Selected Transactions 
Exception handling is critical to the efficacy of continuous auditing. By 
performing a large number of tests over a much higher percentage of transactions, 
continuous auditing expands the testing of details to a large percentage of the 
overall data and can reduce reliance upon analytical procedures (Alles et al., 
2008). It will also result in a large number of selected transactions that have failed 
the audit tests. FCA takes the process one important step further: it adds analytical 
tools to examine the selected transactions for possible errors or acts of fraud. 
Transactions that trigger exceptions or alarms must be responded to in a timely 
manner by qualified individuals with forensic knowledge and skills. Exceptions 
could be handled by internal auditing. Hermanson et al. (2006) suggests that 
software be coded to categorize incidents (selected transactions or events) into 
three categories: errors, misuse, and fraud. By responding to errors immediately, 
the source department may be able to take corrective action that eliminates future 
errors. System misuse could lead to increased employee training and awareness. It 
could also indicate the need for adjusting policies.  
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(2) 
 
33 
 
Selected transactions that require the most scrutiny and careful response are those 
that indicate the possibility of fraud.  Protocols for handling these special events 
should be established in order to facilitate a quick and consistent response. In any 
event, managers should be alerted and action taken to prevent or isolate any 
further occurrence of the event. As Smith (2005) points out, as the time lag 
increases between the suspicion of fraud and the recovery of forensic data, 
evidence becomes less valuable. Larger companies may have an incidence 
response team. If so, they will probably require an analysis of the situation that 
could be performed by the internal audit group. Since SOX02, internal audit has 
reported to the audit committee which is comprised of outside board members. 
This has lessened managerial pressure that might have compromised the past 
effectiveness of the internal audit group. Also, external auditors, an independent 
third body, examine the work of internal auditors that becomes part of the final 
external audit. Internal auditors should play an important role in fraud 
investigation. In public companies, internal auditors must now report directly to 
the audit committee which is composed of outside board members. Also, PCAOB 
5 proscribes the use of internal auditors in the use of substantive testing and other 
parts of the public audit and the internal audit function is perceived as maintaining 
a professional and objective stance in regards to the audit reports.  Using the FCA 
process, internal auditors can examine data sets to uncover and document 
fraudulent commissions. The FCA process may be the first line of defense in 
proactively identifying possible fraud.  
Auditors may also play an investigative role in the development and maintenance 
of forensic evidence. This might require the auditor to perform read-only 
searches, preserve time-stamps, secure data and maintain a proper chain of 
custody (Smith, 2005).  
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Figure 2:  Trending Revenues with Cost of Goods Sold 
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4.2 Audit Rules 
Regulators and the public expect auditors to uncover fraud. Research, however, 
does not support the ability of either external or internal auditors to uncover 
significant amounts of fraud (Albrecht et al., 2001). Thus, auditors must be 
trained to seek out specific types of fraud when analyzing the selected 
transactions. Special attention should be given to revenue manipulation and 
income-increasing manipulation because these are the most frequently occurring 
items in financial statement fraud (Johnson and Ireland, 2007).  Transactions that 
fail the audit rules or highlight anomalies would be selected for forensic 
evaluation by internal auditors. For example, in Figure 2, the relationship between 
revenues and cost-of-goods sold is tracked over time. Revenues may be expected 
to vary but the relationship between revenues and cost-of-goods should exhibit a 
low variance and remain fairly smooth. In Figure 2, anomalies are readily 
apparent. These discrepancies require investigation and could reveal a fraudulent 
misstatement of revenues. The third requirement of the FCA Model is forensic 
evaluation of the selected transactions to determine what actions should be taken. 
5. FORENSIC EVALUATION 
Selected transactions might also uncover control weaknesses. For example, 
monitoring of access rights might identify instances of employee attempting to 
access unauthorized files or incompatible sets of files. The event would allow 
supervisors to take immediate action and correct the problem and modify the 
control. 
Continuous auditing and monitoring can be expected to increase the likelihood 
that all fraud, including financial statement fraud, is reduced or detected in a 
timely manner. A large percentage of transactions are investigated and some 
results are presented in a graphical format. Transactions that fail audit rules would 
be written to a selected transactions file. Forensic evaluation using extended 
analytical procedures applied to the selected transactions allows proper and timely 
scrutiny. The forensic evaluation should examine the relationships between 
financial data within a period and over periods to detect anomalies that require 
investigation.  
Financial statement fraud can have a devastating impact on a firm’s stock price 
causing shares to drop as much as 1,000 times the fraud amount (Albrecht et al., 
2001). Financial statement fraud in the United States accounted for 68 percent of 
reported fraud losses in 2009 (ACFE, 2010). Because executive management has 
the ability to override controls, this type of fraud is more difficult to detect. By 
examining relationships, such as the ones presented in Figure 2, auditors can 
ascertain and quickly examine deviations in revenues. Most financial fraud 
involves revenue manipulation. Being able to question anomalies faster will place 
executive management on the alert and help to deter such actions in a proactive 
manner. 
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FCA systems could monitor 100 percent of an organization’s financial 
transactions and business activities in real-time. Automating the analysis and 
testing reduces the cost of SOX02 compliance and reduces the risk of loss beyond 
what could be expected of periodic testing of small transaction sets.  
5.1 Analytical Tools 
Although many firms have adopted ERP solutions and have access to embedded 
audit routines, there are valid arguments for examining a modified approach to 
FCA. Research has shown limited support for the use of embedded audit modules 
in ERP systems (Debreceny et. al, 2005). Firms may have multiple ERP systems 
and each would require auditors to master the internal EAM. EAMs that operate 
internally can cause significant reductions in performance. An alternative is to use 
generalized audit software and apply established audit rules to transaction files in 
order to uncover erroneous or fraudulent transactions.  
Audit Command Language (ACL) and Interactive Data Extraction and Analysis 
(IDEA) are well known audit software that can be used for developing CAATs. 
Both can be learned without extensive training and have a high level of vendor 
support. ACL, for example, offers the ability to conduct continuous auditing over 
several ERP systems and other applications. In addition to supporting a large 
number of analytical functions these CAATs are capable of extracting data from a 
large number of file formats. Using ACL analytics such as Benford Analysis, one 
investigative audit by Forensic Strategic Solutions uncovered more than $70 
million of fraudulent expenditures (ACL, 2011). Events such as these could be 
detected routinely using established fraud audit criteria to test transactions and 
controls. Controls could allow selected transactions to be further inspected using 
other computer tools that support forensic analysis. For example, Benford analysis 
uses a z-statistic to measure the probability that a group of data falls outside the 
expected distribution. For certain data sets, transactions for which the first digit 
was outside a z-statistic of 2.0 could be triggered for further examination. The 
trigger points could be adjusted based upon experience. Correlation and time-
series analysis can also be used to detect errors and fraud in the selected 
transactions (Nigrini, 2006). The final stage of the FCA Model is refinement of 
the rules.  
6. REFINEMENT OF RULES 
6.1 Designing Audit Rules 
Examples of possible audit tests are shown in Table 2. Such tests are commonly 
performed manually on smaller sets of transactions and at distinct time intervals. 
The audit rules can test for errors, fraud, and the strength and presence of internal 
controls while also performing some substantive tests. Results can be used to 
create compliance reports. Refining the rules will require the judgment of 
experienced internal auditors based upon the performance of the fraud audit 
model. Rules can be modified based upon perceived risks and management 
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objectives. Audit rules drive the analysis of transactions and events. These 
analytical criteria are created to flag transactions that violate policy or could 
indicate a fraudulent act. If the criteria are too stringent a large number of alarms 
(called alarm flooding) will be produced. To prevent the enormous number of 
false positives audit rules must be properly calibrated (Kuhn and Sutton, 2010; 
Alles et al., 2008).  
 If too loosely set the tests could fail to detect a large percentage of erroneous and 
fraudulent transactions. A major benefit of such a process is that the audit rules 
can be expanded and periodically evaluated for efficacy and adjusted based upon 
performance. Over time, experience-based adjustment of the audit rules can make 
them more efficient and effective. Fraud audit tests should be designed around 
objectives.  
6.2 Forensic Analysis of Selected Transactions 
Selected transactions can provide information to proactively detect impending 
frauds. By examining trends in certain data series, anomalies can be inspected for 
possible defalcations. Chen and Sennetti (2005) demonstrated seventeen financial 
and non-financial variables useful in predicting fraud. Most important were, 
relative to sales, lower research and development costs, lower marketing costs, 
and lower changes in free cash flows.  
Special attention should be paid to financial statement fraud which is the most 
costly and often requires an override of internal controls. Financial statement 
fraud and earnings mismanagement can be detected through the judicious 
application of a set of quantitative and qualitative red flags (Grove and Cook, 
2004). An overstatement of revenues would be a possible indicator (Johnson and 
Ireland, 2007).  
Table 2:  Examples of Fraud Audit Tests 
 
Fraud Objective 
 
Fraud Flag 
 
Fraud Audit Tests 
Fraudulent vendors Vendor address P.O box, 
Vendor address matches 
employee address, 
Multiple vendor 
addresses 
Check validity of vendor 
numbers, Check for P.O. 
boxes as addresses, 
Match vendor addresses to 
employee addresses, Flag 
large changes in vendor 
activity, Extract vendors 
having no tax ID no. 
Ghost employees Employees with same 
address 
Check employee 
addresses for matches, 
Invalid Social Security 
numbers, Compare 
number of employees over 
years to insure changes 
match new minus 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(2) 
 
37 
 
terminated employees, 
Flag employees who have 
not used benefits  
Unauthorized file 
access 
Employees accessing 
unauthorized files or 
incompatible files 
Compare log-ins to access 
rights and privileges 
Inventory loss Inventory adjustments Flag all adjustments 
exceeding a set 
percentage, Check 
deliveries outside of 
regular hours, Check 
employee access to 
restricted areas during 
irregular hours 
Vendor kickbacks to 
managers who order 
at high levels 
Inventory levels exceed 
established peaks, 
Average inventories too 
high 
Examine average 
inventory levels and high 
volume purchases, 
Establish an economic 
order quantity and require 
a signed override by 
inventory manager for 
larger amounts 
Copying sensitive 
data files (intellectual 
property or 
personally 
identifiable 
information) 
Employees accessing 
unauthorized files, Copy 
attempts on protected 
files 
Compare copy attempts to 
rights and privileges 
Financial statement 
fraud 
Senior management 
making fraudulent entries 
Flag all journal and ledger 
entries by executive 
management, Flag all 
entries that boost revenues 
over a certain percentage, 
Flag significant 
transactions with related 
party, Review sales 
recorded by Corporate 
Headquarters 
Invalid earnings  Adjustments to estimates 
such as bad debt 
allowance, amortization 
of intangibles, insurance 
claims, etc. 
Flag changes that exceed 
a set percent or ones 
made by executive 
management (should be 
made by lower level 
accountants) 
Cash larceny High differences between 
sales and cash receipts, 
High refunds, voids, A/R 
write-offs 
Summarize information by 
employee and flag all large 
differences 
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Two examples of quantitative red flags would be irrational ratio analysis of Gross 
Margin Index and Sales Growth Index in order to determine if they fell outside of 
the industry norm. Horizontal analysis of the ratios could also point out trends and 
anomalies. Two examples of qualitative red flags would be significant insider 
sell-off of shares and opaque financial reporting and disclosures designed to 
confuse and mislead investors (Grove and Cook, 2004). 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the possible application of forensic analysis. In Figure 3, 
Benford Analysis is used to analyze employee expenses. If the distribution of 
first-digits follows Benford’s Law, then the resulting z-statistic would be low. The 
auditor might have a rule such as: do not investigate unless a digit has a z-statistic 
greater than 2. Such a rule can easily be altered over time. 
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Figure 3:  Applying Benford Analysis to Employee Expenses 
In Figure 4, the number of transactions is compared to the percentage of known 
errors and outliers (for example, values that exceed the average by greater than 3 
standard errors). Again, anomalies become quickly apparent allowing the auditor 
to focus the investigation on areas that are most likely to indicate a problem. 
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Figure 4:  History of Transactions with Error Rate and Outliers 
7. PROPOSITIONS 
The following five propositions support the use of the FCA model as an effective 
method for deterring and detecting corporate fraud. They are rooted in practical 
realities that are likely to persist and place undue burdens on management, 
auditors and key stakeholders unless a technological solution is adopted. 
 With continuous auditing, auditors can design audit rules that test a large set of 
transactions (perhaps 100%) at determined time intervals. With FCA, the rules 
can test for errors, fraud, and the strength and presence of internal controls, while 
also performing some substantive tests. Results can be used to create compliance 
reports. Over time, experience-based adjustment of the audit rules can make them 
more efficient and effective. Anomalies and outliers can quickly indicate the 
presence of potential problems. Thus, 
Proposition 1:  Forensic continuous auditing will add efficiencies to the 
financial audit process. 
Section 404 of SOX02 has elevated the need for extensive tests of IT internal 
controls that may require the expensive services of a third-party firm. Thus, the 
need for more comprehensive yet cost-effective approaches is recognized by 
external auditors. External auditors, however, must examine controls to insure 
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that insiders are not using their own knowledge to perpetrate frauds. According to 
the ACFE, accountants comprise the single group that commits occupational 
fraud. Owners and executives commit the most expensive frauds (ACFE, 2011). 
By allowing the client’s internal auditors to perform extensive testing of controls 
through continuous auditing procedures, the external auditor can avoid expanding 
the time-consuming and expensive substantive testing. Regulations require that 
certain substantive tests be performed. Auditing Standard AU 319.80, 81 states 
that “regardless of the assessed level of control risk, the auditor should perform 
substantive tests for significant account balances and transaction classes.’’ By 
having access to increased data sets and allowing the client’s internal auditors to 
perform more of the transaction testing through continuous auditing, the external 
auditor will be able to focus on more important activities that are more likely to 
lower risk. Thus, 
Proposition 2:  External auditors will perceive forensic continuous auditing 
positively. 
PCAOB 5, An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting that is 
Integrated with an Audit of Financial Statements, has increased the reliance that 
external auditors can place on evidence generated by internal audit departments in 
an effort to reduce duplication of efforts and lower audit costs. FCA combined 
with CAATs are capable of monitoring internal controls for SOX02 compliance 
reporting and uncover areas of higher audit risk. As external auditors rely more on 
the internal audit and client’s automated controls and governance testing 
mechanisms, less time will be required of external auditors or IT auditors. 
Additionally, fewer requests for ad hoc data sets will be made of the IT 
department. By having an established process in which audit rules can be 
increased and modified over time to improve the quality of the results, the internal 
auditors will play a higher role in the assurance process and be viewed more 
favorably by the audit committee and by management.  
Proposition 3:  Internal auditors will perceive forensic continuous auditing 
positively. 
Management can be expected to view a system that continuously audits for fraud 
positively because it supports compliance in a cost effective manner. As 
mentioned above, it will allow more work to be subsumed by the internal auditors 
thus decreasing costs and the time external auditors are on the premises. 
Furthermore, the external auditors can access and inspect data sets and reports 
remotely, avoid travel expenses, and not have to import data because the 
documentation and proof of compliance will already exist.  
Management might also take a human resources view towards forensic 
continuous auditing. SOX02 has made acquiring IT auditors even more difficult 
and the number of qualified individuals is relatively small. The number of 
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accountants with a Certified Information Systems Auditor license is less than 
50,000 globally and all companies and accounting firms compete for these 
individuals (Kuhn and Sutton, 2010). Reducing the necessity for IT auditors will 
place less strain on human resources and commensurate salary levels.  
Finally, management will value the ability to phase-in FCA on an application-by-
application basis and expand the number of audit tests over time. Thus, 
Proposition 4:  Management will perceive forensic continuous auditing 
positively. 
SOX02 requires management to evaluate and attest to the effectiveness of an 
internal control system (Arrens et al., 2006). Under increased regulatory scrutiny 
and facing increased audit costs management will seek cost-effective approaches 
to the detection of transaction errors and fraudulent activities. Increased penalties 
for fraud and the low percentage of fraud that is uncovered by auditors will make 
continuous auditing attractive as a forensic tool. Fraud deterrence is recognized as 
an important management objective. To prevent fraud, it is imperative that 
internal controls be tested continuously and that audit rules are established to 
uncover fraudulent events. This can be accomplished by examining a large 
percentage of the transactions and system events.  
SAS 56, Analytical Procedures, requires that auditors perform analytical 
procedures during the planning and final reporting stages of the audit (AICPA, 
1988). Analytical reviews, however, may not be effective at detecting frauds. 
Even large embezzlements may not have a material effect on the earnings of a 
large corporation and may escape discovery during a regularly scheduled audit 
(Wells, 2011).  FCA, however, provides the ability for auditors to perform a 
multitude of analytical procedures over all transactions and significantly increases 
the possibility that errors and suspicious transactions are flagged (Rezaee et al., 
2002).  Properly constructed systems could perform hundreds of different 
analytical tests on a large number of transactions daily. Each test would be 
intended to seek out red flags. For example, delivery dates could be examined for 
times when deliveries are not normally made (holidays, weekends, after hours, 
etc.) and selected transactions would then be reviewed.  
FCA also allows for special alarms called “audit hooks.” These are audit rules that 
snare transactions of a suspicious nature and allow for real-time intervention. A 
common example is when someone travels abroad and uses a credit card outside 
the normal venue. An audit hook captures the first use of the card in the foreign 
venue and immediately alerts a representative who then decides how to handle the 
transaction. One response is to attempt to contact the cardholder by phone or 
email. The response can take less than one minute. The hooks are highly effective 
at detecting and deterring possible fraudulent activities (Romney and Steinbart, 
2008). Thus, 
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Proposition 5:  Management will positively perceive the forensic continuous 
auditing model as an effective and efficient forensic tool. 
8. THE FORENSIC CONTINUOUS AUDIT SYSTEM 
The FCA system is shown in Figure 5. Note that the Forensic Audit Application 
module functions as an embedded audit module but is outside the actual 
production version and can be applied to different applications eliminating the 
necessity of building separate embedded audit modules. 
The Forensic Audit Application works with a cloned copy of the actual 
application using actual transactions but does not alter actual accounts or affect 
the performance of the system. The forensic tests are performed within a short 
period of time after the actual processing. This could be within minutes or within 
a week. Auditors must weigh the benefits and risk with the costs. Higher risk 
transactions would require more immediacy. In any event, there will be a more 
timely and thorough examination than under traditional audit approaches. 
Sensitive audit tests can trigger alarms that request immediate response. 
Otherwise, selected transactions are saved and reports created for scheduled 
reviews. A phased approach would be based on creating a tested system that 
could be copied for other applications. Because invoking the tests within the 
production version of the application could reduce performance significantly, 
performing the tests in the background is preferred.  
Some analysis of selected transactions may indicate the need for deeper inquiry. 
Extended analysis could be performed using a CAAT such as ACL or IDEA.  
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The target application is cloned to the 
audit server creating a virtual 
environment. The actual transactions 
are run on the audit server. 
 
Forensic tests are applied to all 
transactions which may or may not be 
erroneous or fraudulent but are 
selected for review. 
 
Selected transactions are stored for 
retrieval and archival. Control reports 
are created for review of selected 
transactions. Some transactions fail 
sensitive rules that trigger alarms and 
are made available for immediate 
review. 
 
Qualified forensic analysts evaluate 
exceptions and suspicious transactions. 
 
Examination of trends and anomalies 
allow auditors to refine fraud audit 
tests. 
 
Figure 5:  Forensic Continuous Auditing System 
Future Research Considerations 
Future research could examine various unknown aspects of forensic continuous 
auditing. First, and foremost, what is the true cost of implementing a full-scale 
model as presented in the paper. Surveys have shown that many companies have 
implemented CA to some extent but there is no mention in research of specific 
cost-savings. By understanding the cost-savings better, many companies would be 
more likely to adopt the model.  
Second, researchers could examine the effectiveness of various audit tests, 
especially those that would indicate the override of controls that often lead to the 
more expensive financial statement fraud. By identifying and sharing effective 
audit rules, companies could more quickly realize the benefits of forensic CA. 
Future emphasis should be focused on preventive and detective rules as they assist 
internal auditors and the controller in ascertaining the likelihood of threats and 
identifying the source of threats.  
9. CONCLUSIONS 
The role of audits is clearly important and can have a strong preventive effect on 
fraudulent behavior, but audits alone cannot be relied upon exclusively for fraud 
detection and, with the increase of transactions processed, may not be an effective 
mechanism for uncovering errors or misuse. Experience has shown that the 
traditional audit is not an effective mechanism for uncovering fraud. Auditors and 
managers are faced with increased pressure to tighten internal controls and reduce 
corporate risks. At the same time, information systems are becoming increasingly 
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more complex and larger sets of transactions are being processed. Evidence exists 
that when faced with advanced technology auditors often resort to manual 
approaches that are less effective at detecting fraud or material misstatements. 
Using sophisticated audit tests and a graphical presentation of possible 
inconsistencies, auditors have a higher chance of preventing problems with 
internal controls or detecting them when they occur. Although continuous 
auditing is an attractive solution, many companies have failed to embrace it 
because of implementation issues and lack of trained auditors. This paper presents 
cogent reasons for adopting a system of forensic continuous auditing. Based on 
five propositions, an approach is presented that is manageable and scalable and 
can be introduced in phases. By using the continuous auditing approach, 
managers can be assured of transaction integrity and auditors can be relieved of 
some of the burdens of repetitive testing of controls and balances, allowing 
auditors to focus on matters that are more likely to reduce risk. Although 
embedded audit modules are used in some firms, this paper recommends the use 
of a cloned copy of the applications. The FCA still takes place at about the same 
time as the actual transaction processing and the difference from real-time is 
negligible. Examining relationships of revenues items with other associated 
financial and operating items increases the ability of auditors to uncover instances 
in which management may have used system overrides to introduce fictitious 
revenues. By investigating suspicious trends and outliers, auditors can decrease 
the opportunity for manipulation.   
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